The Output Gap Continues; The Impact Of Deficit-Hawks

The difference between "no longer getting worse" and "actually returning to normal":

We stopped getting worse. We still need a serious boost -- like from reversing the austerity of recent budget years -- to get back to good. Alternatively, a large enough boost to EITC could be another way of doing that while at the same time helping mitigate our ever-rising inequality.

Speaking of the recent austerity, here's that in a picture:

Had we not implemented such budget-cutting, deficit-hawk, austerity from 2010 (by not increasing spending commensurate with population growth) and even worse after (by actually reducing government consumption expenditures and gross investment), that alone would have at least had us significantly closer to potential by now. In other words, we'd have had more of a recovery.

Minsky on Recovery

"Pundits, politicians, and officials have proclaimed that the economy escaped the near crisis of 1974-75 as a result of the normal functioning of market processes. In truth, the braking of the downswing and the subsequent recovery were largely the result of strong fiscal measures and prompt lender-of-last-resort interventions. The fiscal measures were partly automatic because of massive entitlement (transfer payment) programs and a tax system in which receipts fell sharply when employment fell and were partly discretionary in the form of tax rebates, tax reductions, and extensions of unemployment insurance."

-- Hyman P. Minsky, from "Stabilizing an Unstable Economy"

Fiscal Conservatism And Necessity

We're in a depression. To many, that's stating the obvious. But it seems not quite everyone realizes just yet.

GDP depressed below normal levels from 2008 through this writing

Our commerce has been significantly below capacity for several years. By the end of 2008 the quarterly output gap exceeded even the previous record (from 1982) for output gaps since 1949. We've seen the main characteristic factors of depression beyond just the raw output gap: increased unemployment, tight credit for consumers and small business, and bank failures (though many of the potential failures were averted). And as anyone familiar with Irving Fisher's work should know, we'd surely have had significant deflation from the paying down of private debts were it not for a series of Fed actions to mitigate deflationary forces.

Deficit hawks ignore the reasons for our deficits in recent years. Depressions increase short-term costs. People out of work utilize the safety net when they wouldn't otherwise. We have a severe short-term increase in costs. At the same time, depressions also reduce revenue. We bring in less tax money because fewer people are getting paid, and often smaller real wages.

There's one clear answer to get rid of deficits: get people back to work. Rev up the economy back to potential. Close the output gap. Until we do that, we'll continue to have increased costs and reduced revenues.

In our attempts to close that output gap, today's fiscal conservatives hamstring us with massive state budget cuts to avoid the temporary tax increases and/or bond issuance needed for dealing with the downturn. Their unwillingness to raise revenue means lots of layoffs, slowing down our economy while hurting the quality of services that we the people want. Many of us would willingly pay more in taxes to keep quality of service through an economic downturn. Many of us would be more than willing to pay more in taxes to keep investing in the sort of growth-spurring government measures that can get us back to expansion. But fiscal conservatives will brook no such sensibility. So instead we get slower growth and less prosperity. Like our slow recovery? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like our rising tuition costs for students? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like our broken roads increasing business costs? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like fewer research patents being licensed to domestic businesses than we'd otherwise have over the coming years? Thank a conservative.

This impact is nothing new. We had deficit hawks and credit growth hawks to thank for the recession of 1937-38 when attempts to balance the budget and tighten monetary policy put a crimp in recovery from the Great Depression. We had sharp cuts in the name of balanced budget zeal to thank for the recessions and increased unemployment under Eisenhower. Time and again, we keep having to re-learn the lesson that sharp cuts hurt even when they're earnestly meant to help.

We're long overdue to stop letting fiscal conservatives shape the narrative. We need to stop worrying about balancing the budget when we're in the midst of a downturn. When the economy's roaring at full steam, then we can afford to mess about with budget balancing. Until then, we can't afford their cuts.

One needs to already be in good shape to recover from a deep, large, sharp cut. Until we've eliminated the output gap, we need more recovery efforts ... not more cuts.

Presidents and Jobs (Average Private Payrolls Added Per Month Since Carter)

Given that Republicans are often billed as the pro-business party, shouldn't we find business booming under Republican Presidents? Shouldn't we find payrolls rising significantly from all that business expansion?

For President Reagan, to be fair, we should note that his early years were hurt by the same force that crushed payrolls under President Carter during April through July of 1980: the high rates with which Paul Volcker battled inflation. Double-digit prime interest rates diminished employment under both Presidents Reagan and Carter. While those unusually high interest rates may have been necessary to get control over inflation, those high rates severely slowed expansion and thus hiring. However, that doesn't remove the possibility that President Reagan's descent from Carter's payroll numbers hinted at the start of a Republican trend under Trickle-down policies. After all, the Bush I policies were largely a continuation of the Reagan policies. If we average together the Reagan and Bush I months, together they get 113.3 thousand jobs / month. That's less than either of Carter or Clinton. And it's also less than the rate of increase we've seen since the turn-around on 2/1/2010 under President Obama.

While these figures aren't conclusive proof alone, add them together with a few other factors such as that GDP growth has lagged under the lowest top marginal tax rates. It sure looks like Trickle-down (or Supply-side economic or Reaganomics) failed us in a big way.

Maybe we should stop accepting the notion that talking about lowering taxes and deregulating would actually be business-friendly. Maybe we should instead consider ways to return to the sort of sensible, progressive tax structures we had before Reagan lead us down the road to decline. Instead of calling it red tape, maybe we should consider regulation's value for helping business manage risk, compete on a level playing field, and have more predictable returns. And maybe we should get back to expecting serious infrastructure projects and demanding aggressive investments in our research and development programs to build our avenues for growth.

Notes on methodology: Generally speaking, the January in which the executive transitions from one branch to another will be almost entirely impacted by the outgoing President's policies and not those of the incoming President. As such, the average uses the change in monthly manufacturing payrolls starting with the change from the first full month of the President's term (i.e., from the February that is the first full month to the March thereafter) and going until the first full month after the President's term (i.e., the last change counted is from the January during which the President in question is last in office to the February thereafter). Data from BLS/FRED.

Presidents and Manufacturing

Average manufacturing jobs / month gained or lost for the past half dozen Presidents and since the turn-around on January 2010.

Notes on methodology: Generally speaking, the January in which the executive transitions from one branch to another will be almost entirely impacted by the outgoing President's policies and not those of the incoming President. As such, the average uses the change in monthly manufacturing payrolls starting with the change from the first full month of the President's term (i.e., from the February that is the first full month to the March thereafter) and going until the first full month after the President's term (i.e., the last change counted is from the January during which the President in question is last in office to the February thereafter). Data from BLS/FRED.

The Course of the Recovery

The course of the recovery:

Legislation and events marked on the above chart:

• ARRA - i.e., "the Stimulus", signed February 17, 2009
• Chrysler reorganization, emerged from govt backed chapter 11 on June 10, 2009
• GM restructuring, emerged from govt backed chapter 11 on July 10, 2009
• The first budget based on President Obama's proposals entered into effect with the start of the govt fiscal year on October 1, 2009.
• UC extended under the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009
• Payrolls reached their lower point of the decline from the Great Recession in February 2010
• March 2010 saw the signing of both HIRE (Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010) and the PPACA (i.e., "Obamacare")
• The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010
• The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 was signed on September 27, 2010
• Some provisions of the ARRA (i.e., the "Stimulus") were extended via the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 signed on December 17, 2010
• The Food Safety and Modernization Act was signed into law on January 4, 2011

No, World War 2 Didn't End The Depression

There's a common myth out there that goes, "the Great Depression was finally ended by World War 2". It has some slight variations, such as "the Great Depression lasted 15 years" or even "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped".

All of these are complete misunderstandings of history if not outright lies.

While there may not be as accepted a definition for depression as for recession, there's a good bit of consensus along the lines of these two criteria for an economic depression:

1. real GDP decline beyond 10%
2. period of decline lasting more than three years

Year	2005 Real GDP
1929	977,000
1930	892,800
1931	834,900
1932	725,800
1933	716,400
1934	794,400

Real GDP declined every year from 1929 through 1933. By 1934, the economy had been pushed back into growth again. There you have it: the end of the Great Depression. It was 1929-1933, far short of 15 years. One can not be in a depression and have real GDP growth because a depression is defined by GDP decline. One can note other factors peculiar to depression, such as deflation. But a depression only exists while there is a declining economy as measured by real GDP. One can debate what ended the Great Depression, whether it was a combination of monetary and fiscal policy, deficit spending alone, monetary policy alone, or some other set of factors. But there is no reasonable debate that the Great Depression ended years before World War 2 when the economy returned to growth.

Some effects of the Great Depression -- though mostly diminished -- did linger somewhat until World War 2. That much is true. Although unemployment had been drastically reduced before the war, it was still high until the war. Yet while it took quite a while to achieve full recovery, it did not take all that long to achieve renewed growth. Unemployment peaked in 1933. By 1936, the New Deal had kicked the economy into rolling again and -- though unemployment was still high -- the main economic indicators were back in gear. In early 1937, industrial production reached a level above that of 1929. But then pressure picked up to balance the budget, and FDR and Congress cut back spending. Although unemployment had been dramatically reduced from its peak, it was still too high for the economy to be self-sustaining. With the fiscal and monetary tightening of 1937, production dropped and unemployment went back up. Seeing the mistake, they stoked spending back up in 1938 and the recovery resumed.

Unemployment remained problematic throughout the 1930s and into the start of the 1940s. But even that measure declined every year that the New Deal was fully in force. The recession of 1937-1938 showed the effect of govt cutbacks pushed by Republicans overzealous to balance the budget at the wrong time. The cuts interrupted the full weight of the New Deal to push the economy forward. The unemployment rate continued to drop right up until the start of the war. We were already growing towards full recovery before the war. Admittedly, the massive increase of spending for the war -- far beyond that of the New Deal -- did push unemployment to very low levels far more rapidly than we would have achieved without the focus of a war effort. But the war boom runs quite the opposite of a case against spending. The extreme, focused spending for the war effort rocketed our economy higher. It was a finale to the New Deal, like a burst of fireworks at the end of a good 4th of July show. It couldn't be further from the truth to say that "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped". When govt cut spending while the economy was still weak, the economy suffered. Except for the disastrous cut-backs that brought us the recession of 1937-1938, government didn't stop spending until the markets had recovered.