The Retail Sales Gap Is The Housing Gap

Atif Mian and Amir Sufi pondered why spending hasn't caught up to trend.

How would spending catch up to trend when employment hasn't caught up to trend?

And why would we expect employment to catch up when home construction lurks below the 1982 recession levels let alone below trend?

And even if employment were caught up, we're not going to have as much retail sales of home furnishings and such household goods until we have as many new homes to furnish.

Notice how in the early 1980s, home construction started up before employment. Just like how in 2006 home construction started slowing before employment ... and then started plummeting before employment.

Retail sales include paint, furnishings, and lots of other household goods. So really, is it any surprise that retail sales haven't recovered to trend but rather have only stopped dropping?

By and large, the home is where the retail sales live.

And why would a home builder ramp up construction when employment is low? Why is it again that we haven't restored the CCC and WPA this time around to get people working?

Looking Forward To Recession? Thank A Deficit Hawk.

Budget cuts during a depression? Expect a recession. And for that recession, thank the obsession with deficits. Because apparently the recession of 1937-38 has been largely forgotten, at least among most Republicans and a few Democrats who join them in worrying about the deficit at what's clearly the wrong time. Trying to balance the budget during a depression is not just an error ... it's a classic error.

"The 1937 episode provides a cautionary tale. The urge to declare victory and get back to normal policy after an economic crisis is strong. That urge needs to be resisted until the economy is again approaching full employment. Financial crises, in particular, tend to leave scars that make financial institutions, households and firms behave differently. If the government withdraws support too early, a return to economic decline or even panic could follow." 

- Christina Romer in "The lessons of 1937" writing for The Economist

This infatuation with deficits and debt steered us wrong before. It looks like we're doomed to repeat the lessons of history that deficit hawks have failed to learn.

The Cost of Balanced Budgets and a Longer View on Presidents and Jobs From Ike To 2012

I'd usually heard the 50s described as more or less a golden era of rising prosperity. But till recently I tended to skip over digging into that decade's economic data to focus on the Great Depression up through World War II (when not mucking about the peaks and valleys of more recent times). So I have to admit this chart surprised me.

starting with Ike, the first President fully covered in the monthly POP data; to June 2012

I was expecting that adding in the Republican Presidents before Reagan would show that prior to Trickle-down / Supply-side economics / Reaganomics infecting the Republican party, they'd done better. I expected to be illustrating the post-Depression glory days of the Republican party via Ike, Nixon, and Ford. Instead, the data gave me what we see above. In jobs, Nixon and Ford both did worse than Johnson, Carter, and Clinton. While Nixon and Ford did better than Obama's marks for his full term so far, they each did worse than during his tepid recovery span from February 2010 on to the latest data. And then there's Ike -- whom we admire -- down there with the likes of the Bushes. I didn't want to see that. Frankly, I wanted to believe Ike pulled off the Clinton trick of balancing the budget while improving employment. But I can't deny the data.

If we look a bit further back, before the dates in the data used above to put payroll growth in perspective via population growth, we can at least compare Ike's raw payroll figures to those from FDR (since 1939) and Truman, but that only rules out claiming Ike's dismal jobs performance as part of a longer trend.

Ike's sad job numbers with context: at least he's not Bush II

It's not a pretty picture for Ike, which I'm sad to see. Thankfully there's still much to admire from President Eisenhower in the highway system and his work for civil rights. I still like Ike. I still think I'd have voted for him if I'd been old enough at the time. But his economic record is tarnished.

In his defense, President Eisenhower did start his term with a 2.6% unemployment rate during that first full month. It's hard to improve on 2.6% unemployment. Still, unemployment rose dramatically to 6.9% by the first full month of his successor's term. Ike's shift: +165% unemployment. That's a rather lousy fumble. And while the Eisenhower years saw increasing family incomes, the same can be said for the Kennedy / Johnson years except without the rising unemployment, as over the course of their span they reduced that rate from the 6.9% that Eisenhower left them back down to 3.4% by the end of Johnson's Presidency.

So what went wrong? Let's look at the modern history of balanced budgets:

• At Republican urging, FDR tried to balance the budget with spending cuts and it brought us the Recession of 1937-38. 
• After World War II we saw dramatic cutbacks in spending with balanced budgets in 1947 through 1949 and the recessions in 1945 and 1949. (Of course, the war spending was unsustainable; there was probably no way to avoid recession in the late 1940s.)
• Truman balanced the budget in 1951. But like the later Clinton-era balanced budgets this one was done while expanding federal outlays ... rather swiftly increasing from the 1948 lows. Then after we slowed spending at the end of the Korean War, we got the recession of 1953.
• Eisenhower balanced the budget in 1956 and 1957 and we got the Recession of 1957.
• Eisenhower balanced the budget again in 1960 and we got the Recession of 1960.
• Nixon balanced the budget in 1969 and we got the Recession of 1970.
• While Clinton balanced the budget in 1998 lasting through Bush's first budget in 2001, the balancing in these years was done without reducing the growth of federal outlays but rather through moderate increase of tax rates. As such, this particular instance was thoroughly different from most previous balancing of the budget (except Truman's).

There were also some recessions that didn't correspond to these balanced budgets: the oil shock under Nixon, the extremely high interest rates under Reagan, the S&L crisis under Bush I, the Dot-Com crash under Clinton and Bush II, and the housing/finance crash under Bush II. I'm not suggesting that all recessions are caused by cutting to achieve balanced budgets. However, it would seem that balancing our national budget via cuts -- even if only in inflation-adjusted terms as in 1960 and 1969 -- tends to lead to recession.

The impact of Eisenhower's budget balancing exploits are particularly of interest for its parallel to job losses in the Great Recession. Private payrolls dropped by 2.385 million between August 1957 and June 1958, a 5.26% decline. By comparison, that's just barely below the 5.47% decline during the worst job-loss months of the Great Recession from August 2008 through June 2009. Remember that saying about doing the same thing and expecting different results. If we implement massive cutbacks like Eisenhower with our sequestration fiscal cliff, we can expect yet another massive fall just like the Eisenhower recession ... and we've not climbed far enough back from the jagged rocks as it is.

In case after case, budgets balanced with spending cuts have brought on recession. And now the Republicans are once again pushing us to balance the budget with dramatic spending cuts. Democrats may not be leading the charge, but Obama like FDR is far too willing to accept the Republican push for cuts. If we don't turn away from this push to slash budgets, previous experience shows us it will hurt the economy. When we make the debt more manageable by growing our economy such that the debt shrinks by comparison, that's tended to work out well. When we clumsily attempt to tackle the debt directly by slashing spending to balance the budget in the hopes a primary surplus, the records shows it tends to work out poorly.

No, World War 2 Didn't End The Depression

There's a common myth out there that goes, "the Great Depression was finally ended by World War 2". It has some slight variations, such as "the Great Depression lasted 15 years" or even "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped".

All of these are complete misunderstandings of history if not outright lies.

While there may not be as accepted a definition for depression as for recession, there's a good bit of consensus along the lines of these two criteria for an economic depression:

1. real GDP decline beyond 10%
2. period of decline lasting more than three years

Year	2005 Real GDP
1929	977,000
1930	892,800
1931	834,900
1932	725,800
1933	716,400
1934	794,400

Real GDP declined every year from 1929 through 1933. By 1934, the economy had been pushed back into growth again. There you have it: the end of the Great Depression. It was 1929-1933, far short of 15 years. One can not be in a depression and have real GDP growth because a depression is defined by GDP decline. One can note other factors peculiar to depression, such as deflation. But a depression only exists while there is a declining economy as measured by real GDP. One can debate what ended the Great Depression, whether it was a combination of monetary and fiscal policy, deficit spending alone, monetary policy alone, or some other set of factors. But there is no reasonable debate that the Great Depression ended years before World War 2 when the economy returned to growth.

Some effects of the Great Depression -- though mostly diminished -- did linger somewhat until World War 2. That much is true. Although unemployment had been drastically reduced before the war, it was still high until the war. Yet while it took quite a while to achieve full recovery, it did not take all that long to achieve renewed growth. Unemployment peaked in 1933. By 1936, the New Deal had kicked the economy into rolling again and -- though unemployment was still high -- the main economic indicators were back in gear. In early 1937, industrial production reached a level above that of 1929. But then pressure picked up to balance the budget, and FDR and Congress cut back spending. Although unemployment had been dramatically reduced from its peak, it was still too high for the economy to be self-sustaining. With the fiscal and monetary tightening of 1937, production dropped and unemployment went back up. Seeing the mistake, they stoked spending back up in 1938 and the recovery resumed.

Unemployment remained problematic throughout the 1930s and into the start of the 1940s. But even that measure declined every year that the New Deal was fully in force. The recession of 1937-1938 showed the effect of govt cutbacks pushed by Republicans overzealous to balance the budget at the wrong time. The cuts interrupted the full weight of the New Deal to push the economy forward. The unemployment rate continued to drop right up until the start of the war. We were already growing towards full recovery before the war. Admittedly, the massive increase of spending for the war -- far beyond that of the New Deal -- did push unemployment to very low levels far more rapidly than we would have achieved without the focus of a war effort. But the war boom runs quite the opposite of a case against spending. The extreme, focused spending for the war effort rocketed our economy higher. It was a finale to the New Deal, like a burst of fireworks at the end of a good 4th of July show. It couldn't be further from the truth to say that "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped". When govt cut spending while the economy was still weak, the economy suffered. Except for the disastrous cut-backs that brought us the recession of 1937-1938, government didn't stop spending until the markets had recovered.

Gross Govt Impact

The idea that we should make huge govt budget cuts is premised on the notion that our economy would be better off that way, wouldn't be hurt by it, or at least would soldier on about the same. Sometimes the best insight into that notion comes from people who weren' even discussing budget cuts directly. Daniel Gross's recent article about whether to buy bonds or not didn't touch on the idea of budget cuts at all. It's one and only focus was on whether US govt bonds are still a safe-haven investment compared to stocks. To explain that, he covers the impact on stocks if the US runs up against the debt ceiling and stops spending to not default on bonds.

"The U.S. government occupies a pretty large footprint in the economy. It employs 2.85 million people directly. Next, think of all the businesses, many of them publicly held, that rely on the government  for a big chunk of their business. For-profit education companies, defense contractors, the entire health care industry, Wal-Mart and other retailers that cater to people who depend on federal benefits to help pay their grocery bills. Every large consulting firm, every large tech firm (from Microsoft to IBM) has a large unit that provides services and products to the federal government.

Should the U.S. bump up against the debt limit without resolution, it's possible the Pentagon would delay indefinitely the signing of new contracts for fighter jets. Or agencies would cancel or slowdown payment on IT projects. Or Congressmen and their staffers would see their wages reduced. Or fewer people would get food stamps. The cumulative impact would be less demand, less economic activity, more uncertainty."

In pointing this out, Mr. Gross was ostensibly more concerned with explaining why bonds seem a relatively safe investment at this point. He says, "government reliance on debt to fund of operations and investments is so great that they'd rather alienate workers and citizens and taxpayers than anger the bond market." So all the explanation of what they'd have to do to avoid angering the bond market just explains why stocks are the more risky bet despite debt ceiling fears.

Yet there's a far more important take away than Mr. Gross's surface question of whether it makes more sense to invest in bonds versus stocks. Those payments we'd have to avoid making? They're a lot like the cuts the GOP wants to make. If the Republicans got their way -- the whole thing for which they're playing chicken with the debt ceiling -- we'd see most of those cuts. No wonder they don't care about the debt ceiling, if what they figure we'd avoid paying to avoid default are the things they don't want to fund anyway. And "Of course, all these moves would be contractionary — they'd help slow economic growth."

Contraction, by the way, is more or less a general term for things like recessions and depressions. Mr. Gross didn't speculate on whether those non-payments (or cuts, if de-funded in a relatively orderly manner) would cause a mere recession or a full-fledged depression. But that's really the remaining question for anyone who might be paying attention to where the Republicans goals would shove us. If the Republicans get their massive budget cuts, the question isn't whether it'll hammer the economy, the question is only how hard ... and whether we've ever seen it hammered that hard before.

Financial Crisis: Just One of Many

Just another one of many: some folks have likened this latest financial crisis to the Great Depression, or at least billed it as the worst financial crisis since then. It may have been as much or more like the Panic of 1873.

Of course, parts of the Panic of 1857 sound really familiar too: "...by July 1856, banks began to lend far more money than they could back up..."