The Retail Sales Gap Is The Housing Gap

Atif Mian and Amir Sufi pondered why spending hasn't caught up to trend.

How would spending catch up to trend when employment hasn't caught up to trend?

And why would we expect employment to catch up when home construction lurks below the 1982 recession levels let alone below trend?

And even if employment were caught up, we're not going to have as much retail sales of home furnishings and such household goods until we have as many new homes to furnish.

Notice how in the early 1980s, home construction started up before employment. Just like how in 2006 home construction started slowing before employment ... and then started plummeting before employment.

Retail sales include paint, furnishings, and lots of other household goods. So really, is it any surprise that retail sales haven't recovered to trend but rather have only stopped dropping?

By and large, the home is where the retail sales live.

And why would a home builder ramp up construction when employment is low? Why is it again that we haven't restored the CCC and WPA this time around to get people working?

Looking Forward To Recession? Thank A Deficit Hawk.

Budget cuts during a depression? Expect a recession. And for that recession, thank the obsession with deficits. Because apparently the recession of 1937-38 has been largely forgotten, at least among most Republicans and a few Democrats who join them in worrying about the deficit at what's clearly the wrong time. Trying to balance the budget during a depression is not just an error ... it's a classic error.

"The 1937 episode provides a cautionary tale. The urge to declare victory and get back to normal policy after an economic crisis is strong. That urge needs to be resisted until the economy is again approaching full employment. Financial crises, in particular, tend to leave scars that make financial institutions, households and firms behave differently. If the government withdraws support too early, a return to economic decline or even panic could follow." 

- Christina Romer in "The lessons of 1937" writing for The Economist

This infatuation with deficits and debt steered us wrong before. It looks like we're doomed to repeat the lessons of history that deficit hawks have failed to learn.

Fiscal Conservatism And Necessity

We're in a depression. To many, that's stating the obvious. But it seems not quite everyone realizes just yet.

GDP depressed below normal levels from 2008 through this writing

Our commerce has been significantly below capacity for several years. By the end of 2008 the quarterly output gap exceeded even the previous record (from 1982) for output gaps since 1949. We've seen the main characteristic factors of depression beyond just the raw output gap: increased unemployment, tight credit for consumers and small business, and bank failures (though many of the potential failures were averted). And as anyone familiar with Irving Fisher's work should know, we'd surely have had significant deflation from the paying down of private debts were it not for a series of Fed actions to mitigate deflationary forces.

Deficit hawks ignore the reasons for our deficits in recent years. Depressions increase short-term costs. People out of work utilize the safety net when they wouldn't otherwise. We have a severe short-term increase in costs. At the same time, depressions also reduce revenue. We bring in less tax money because fewer people are getting paid, and often smaller real wages.

There's one clear answer to get rid of deficits: get people back to work. Rev up the economy back to potential. Close the output gap. Until we do that, we'll continue to have increased costs and reduced revenues.

In our attempts to close that output gap, today's fiscal conservatives hamstring us with massive state budget cuts to avoid the temporary tax increases and/or bond issuance needed for dealing with the downturn. Their unwillingness to raise revenue means lots of layoffs, slowing down our economy while hurting the quality of services that we the people want. Many of us would willingly pay more in taxes to keep quality of service through an economic downturn. Many of us would be more than willing to pay more in taxes to keep investing in the sort of growth-spurring government measures that can get us back to expansion. But fiscal conservatives will brook no such sensibility. So instead we get slower growth and less prosperity. Like our slow recovery? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like our rising tuition costs for students? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like our broken roads increasing business costs? Thank a fiscal conservative. Like fewer research patents being licensed to domestic businesses than we'd otherwise have over the coming years? Thank a conservative.

This impact is nothing new. We had deficit hawks and credit growth hawks to thank for the recession of 1937-38 when attempts to balance the budget and tighten monetary policy put a crimp in recovery from the Great Depression. We had sharp cuts in the name of balanced budget zeal to thank for the recessions and increased unemployment under Eisenhower. Time and again, we keep having to re-learn the lesson that sharp cuts hurt even when they're earnestly meant to help.

We're long overdue to stop letting fiscal conservatives shape the narrative. We need to stop worrying about balancing the budget when we're in the midst of a downturn. When the economy's roaring at full steam, then we can afford to mess about with budget balancing. Until then, we can't afford their cuts.

One needs to already be in good shape to recover from a deep, large, sharp cut. Until we've eliminated the output gap, we need more recovery efforts ... not more cuts.

No, World War 2 Didn't End The Depression

There's a common myth out there that goes, "the Great Depression was finally ended by World War 2". It has some slight variations, such as "the Great Depression lasted 15 years" or even "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped".

All of these are complete misunderstandings of history if not outright lies.

While there may not be as accepted a definition for depression as for recession, there's a good bit of consensus along the lines of these two criteria for an economic depression:

1. real GDP decline beyond 10%
2. period of decline lasting more than three years

Year	2005 Real GDP
1929	977,000
1930	892,800
1931	834,900
1932	725,800
1933	716,400
1934	794,400

Real GDP declined every year from 1929 through 1933. By 1934, the economy had been pushed back into growth again. There you have it: the end of the Great Depression. It was 1929-1933, far short of 15 years. One can not be in a depression and have real GDP growth because a depression is defined by GDP decline. One can note other factors peculiar to depression, such as deflation. But a depression only exists while there is a declining economy as measured by real GDP. One can debate what ended the Great Depression, whether it was a combination of monetary and fiscal policy, deficit spending alone, monetary policy alone, or some other set of factors. But there is no reasonable debate that the Great Depression ended years before World War 2 when the economy returned to growth.

Some effects of the Great Depression -- though mostly diminished -- did linger somewhat until World War 2. That much is true. Although unemployment had been drastically reduced before the war, it was still high until the war. Yet while it took quite a while to achieve full recovery, it did not take all that long to achieve renewed growth. Unemployment peaked in 1933. By 1936, the New Deal had kicked the economy into rolling again and -- though unemployment was still high -- the main economic indicators were back in gear. In early 1937, industrial production reached a level above that of 1929. But then pressure picked up to balance the budget, and FDR and Congress cut back spending. Although unemployment had been dramatically reduced from its peak, it was still too high for the economy to be self-sustaining. With the fiscal and monetary tightening of 1937, production dropped and unemployment went back up. Seeing the mistake, they stoked spending back up in 1938 and the recovery resumed.

Unemployment remained problematic throughout the 1930s and into the start of the 1940s. But even that measure declined every year that the New Deal was fully in force. The recession of 1937-1938 showed the effect of govt cutbacks pushed by Republicans overzealous to balance the budget at the wrong time. The cuts interrupted the full weight of the New Deal to push the economy forward. The unemployment rate continued to drop right up until the start of the war. We were already growing towards full recovery before the war. Admittedly, the massive increase of spending for the war -- far beyond that of the New Deal -- did push unemployment to very low levels far more rapidly than we would have achieved without the focus of a war effort. But the war boom runs quite the opposite of a case against spending. The extreme, focused spending for the war effort rocketed our economy higher. It was a finale to the New Deal, like a burst of fireworks at the end of a good 4th of July show. It couldn't be further from the truth to say that "the market didn't recover until govt spending stopped". When govt cut spending while the economy was still weak, the economy suffered. Except for the disastrous cut-backs that brought us the recession of 1937-1938, government didn't stop spending until the markets had recovered.

Gross Govt Impact

The idea that we should make huge govt budget cuts is premised on the notion that our economy would be better off that way, wouldn't be hurt by it, or at least would soldier on about the same. Sometimes the best insight into that notion comes from people who weren' even discussing budget cuts directly. Daniel Gross's recent article about whether to buy bonds or not didn't touch on the idea of budget cuts at all. It's one and only focus was on whether US govt bonds are still a safe-haven investment compared to stocks. To explain that, he covers the impact on stocks if the US runs up against the debt ceiling and stops spending to not default on bonds.

"The U.S. government occupies a pretty large footprint in the economy. It employs 2.85 million people directly. Next, think of all the businesses, many of them publicly held, that rely on the government  for a big chunk of their business. For-profit education companies, defense contractors, the entire health care industry, Wal-Mart and other retailers that cater to people who depend on federal benefits to help pay their grocery bills. Every large consulting firm, every large tech firm (from Microsoft to IBM) has a large unit that provides services and products to the federal government.

Should the U.S. bump up against the debt limit without resolution, it's possible the Pentagon would delay indefinitely the signing of new contracts for fighter jets. Or agencies would cancel or slowdown payment on IT projects. Or Congressmen and their staffers would see their wages reduced. Or fewer people would get food stamps. The cumulative impact would be less demand, less economic activity, more uncertainty."

In pointing this out, Mr. Gross was ostensibly more concerned with explaining why bonds seem a relatively safe investment at this point. He says, "government reliance on debt to fund of operations and investments is so great that they'd rather alienate workers and citizens and taxpayers than anger the bond market." So all the explanation of what they'd have to do to avoid angering the bond market just explains why stocks are the more risky bet despite debt ceiling fears.

Yet there's a far more important take away than Mr. Gross's surface question of whether it makes more sense to invest in bonds versus stocks. Those payments we'd have to avoid making? They're a lot like the cuts the GOP wants to make. If the Republicans got their way -- the whole thing for which they're playing chicken with the debt ceiling -- we'd see most of those cuts. No wonder they don't care about the debt ceiling, if what they figure we'd avoid paying to avoid default are the things they don't want to fund anyway. And "Of course, all these moves would be contractionary — they'd help slow economic growth."

Contraction, by the way, is more or less a general term for things like recessions and depressions. Mr. Gross didn't speculate on whether those non-payments (or cuts, if de-funded in a relatively orderly manner) would cause a mere recession or a full-fledged depression. But that's really the remaining question for anyone who might be paying attention to where the Republicans goals would shove us. If the Republicans get their massive budget cuts, the question isn't whether it'll hammer the economy, the question is only how hard ... and whether we've ever seen it hammered that hard before.