The state of industry speaks for itself better than some candidates do. When Mitt Romney in Toledo on the 26th of September, 2012 said, "we see manufacturing jobs disappear", he neglected to mention that most of that disappearing happened during the tenure of a President who implemented the same policies that Romney himself is pushing. He also neglected to mention that under the current President they're not disappearing anymore. Under the current President, we've seen manufacturing jobs grow again.
In manufacturing in specific, manufacturing jobs moved mostly sideways through the first quarter of 2006, creeping to a peak in April of that year. From the April 2006 peak, 1.844 million manufacturing jobs were lost under the Bush II administration by the first full month of President Obama's term. From the floor in January 2010, we've recovered 512 thousand manufacturing jobs as of August 2012. There's still a long way to go, but adding half a million manufacturing jobs since January 2010 is growth, not "disappearing".
Here be dragons of economics, politics, and news ... traditionally non-partisan, but we've got to admit that we find one of the parties makes that rather hard to maintain in the present day
Thursday, September 27, 2012
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Social Security and the Elderly Bread: Individualistic Solutions Inferior, Except When The World Ends ... and Then Who Would Be Counting?
John Kay reminds us of an excellent analysis of why we implement "welfare" programs in, "The welfare state’s a worthy Ponzi scheme", from which a highlight follows:
Social security is a means of inter-generational transfer. The only bread fit to eat is bread baked today: but why should today’s bakers feed the retired bakers of yesteryear? Why should we look after old people, who can no longer do anything for us?
... We feed the generations of our parents and grandparents in the expectation future generations will come along and do the same for us. ... One day, the world will end and the last generation of workers will have been cheated of their expectation of a peaceful retirement. ...
A brilliant analysis of the issues was provided half a century ago by Paul Samuelson, the great economist – an analysis that might have received wider attention had it not been written in mathematics and published under the uninviting title of “An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or without the social contrivance of money”.
The only individualistic solutions to the problem of ageing are to store bread to eat, or sell, when it is stale and you are old; or to take the opportunity when young to bribe younger people to look after you in your dotage. Samuelson showed these outcomes were inferior to the outcome of the social security contract for every generation except the one alive on judgment day.
The rest of the article -- over at the Financial Times -- is also well worth the read, despite Kay's acceptance of the idea that "Ponzi scheme" can be reasonably applied to these social contracts. The designation of Ponzi scheme only applies to those plans that will fail even if everyone involved sticks to them and keeps going, failing because the scheme's earnings will necessarily be less than those promised in payout. Social security and the like will continue to function and pay out what's promised so long as our society sticks to them, administers them sensibly, and doesn't end. That's partially because we adjust the earnings / output to what can be done with the current demographic environment, but that makes it not qualify as a Ponzi scheme. The mere fact that someone won't be able to derive theoretical benefits after the society ends isn't enough to qualify as a Ponzi scheme. If it were, every transaction that isn't fulfilled instantly would be a Ponzi scheme.
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Social Security and the Elderly Bread: Individualistic Solutions Inferior, Except When The World Ends ... and Then Who Would Be Counting?
Labels:
inter-generational transfer,
John Kay,
Paul Samuelson,
social contract,
social security,
welfare,
welfare state
Monday, September 24, 2012
Real GDP, the Past Eight Years, and the Years To Come
Real GDP for the past 8 years:
Whatever else one may or may not read into this chart, it sure doesn't help the case for those who would say we should change ships back to the party of Bush II.
Of course, if one adds in potential GDP, essentially where the GDP ought to be right now if we were going to be back to "normal", we're clearly not done. It's roughly like we're going 45 in a 55 MPH zone. There's some serious work to be done to get the economy up to speed. So why has the debate been about how much to raise our foot off the pedal instead of how much further to press down?
Whatever else one may or may not read into this chart, it sure doesn't help the case for those who would say we should change ships back to the party of Bush II.
Of course, if one adds in potential GDP, essentially where the GDP ought to be right now if we were going to be back to "normal", we're clearly not done. It's roughly like we're going 45 in a 55 MPH zone. There's some serious work to be done to get the economy up to speed. So why has the debate been about how much to raise our foot off the pedal instead of how much further to press down?
Labels:
GDP,
output gap,
potential GDP,
Real GDP
Saturday, September 22, 2012
When It Went Wrong
When did things start down? Where was the bump in the road that triggered the Great Recession? In this election season, that question matters in the short term for trying to choose the folks most likely to not send us back down the same path. Partisans from both major parties would love to tell us things when wrong under the other party's watch, but only one side can say it accurately. So when did it start?
To begin answering that question, we can't just look at GDP or unemployment alone. While those may tell us when things really got bad, they don't tell us when the problem started. To get a better idea of when the problem started requires focusing further back than when it became obvious to everyone. The overall economy was hammered by a financial crisis, but that financial crisis didn't just spring up on its own. The financial crisis was triggered by a stumbling housing market. So when did housing tumble off the cliff?
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| Housing fell off a cliff in 2006; in 2007/8, it was just still falling from 2006. |
Building permits peaked on September 2005 and then proceeded to fluctuate through January 2006. Housing starts peaked in January 2006. Then after January 6th, both building permits and housing starts tumbled off that cliff, followed soon after by residential construction. Between the January 2006 peak and the start of the 110th Congress in January 2007, housing starts dropped by 38% and residential construction dropped by 15%. The housing industry was collapsing throughout 2006 and bringing layoffs starting with housing and spreading into related domestic industries such as window and cabinet making. Following on housing's decline, manufacturers new orders hit choppy waters in 2006, . By the end of 2006, the effects weren't yet enough to seriously shake unemployment or turn GDP negative, but the decline did start to show in other measures and a slackening of quarterly GDP growth. The annual growth in consumption per capita for 2006 started back down from what we'd seen in 2005.
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| Demand/person slowed down in 2006 ... before getting to an actual drop. |
Put it all together it's really only a technicality that the recession didn't hit until late 2007. In fact, the economy was already in rough shape in 2006, with really lousy growth evident over the 2nd and 4th quarters of 2006, to the point of quarterly GDP growth just barely staying out of negatives.
Clearly, the first wave of what became the Great Recession was well under way during the watch of the 109th Congress (2005-2006) under President Bush II, even though we hadn't reached technical recession yet. What happened during the 110th Congress was just that it became clear that the problem -- which was already under way -- was spreading from housing into finance and from there to everything else. The curtain covering over the problems was pulled away in 2007-2008, but the trouble was there before the curtain pulled away. Republicans held majorities in both Houses of the 109th Congress, as they had for almost all of the time since 1995 (except for a slim Senate flip in part of the 107th Congress). By 2006, Republican policies had held sway in both the executive and legislative for years and they were still in control. While there's room for debate as to how much involvement government had in the creating or allowing the mess, the weight of evidence says that if one were going to blame governance, the party to blame for that mess is Republican.
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| 2006 wasn't technically recession; but it was darn close. |
Clearly, the first wave of what became the Great Recession was well under way during the watch of the 109th Congress (2005-2006) under President Bush II, even though we hadn't reached technical recession yet. What happened during the 110th Congress was just that it became clear that the problem -- which was already under way -- was spreading from housing into finance and from there to everything else. The curtain covering over the problems was pulled away in 2007-2008, but the trouble was there before the curtain pulled away. Republicans held majorities in both Houses of the 109th Congress, as they had for almost all of the time since 1995 (except for a slim Senate flip in part of the 107th Congress). By 2006, Republican policies had held sway in both the executive and legislative for years and they were still in control. While there's room for debate as to how much involvement government had in the creating or allowing the mess, the weight of evidence says that if one were going to blame governance, the party to blame for that mess is Republican.
Labels:
109th Congress,
Bush,
construction,
economy,
financial crisis,
GDP,
Great Recession,
housing,
manufacturing,
market,
unemployment
Thursday, September 20, 2012
Brad DeLong, Latte, and Ludwig von Mises
Of all the things Brad DeLong as written so far, this may well be the best quip yet:
"We accept money because if we don't have any money we have to buy commodities with other commodities, and when we do so we are unlikely to receive the cost of production for what we sell. Have you ever tried to buy a latte at Peets with a copy of Ludwig von Mises's Money and Credit? It does not go well."
Monday, September 17, 2012
Real GDP Growth and Top Marginal Tax Rates
Regressive fiscal policy depends on the idea that cutting upper bracket taxes will somehow bring growth. Reality seems to show quite the opposite results, as seen in the charts below.
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| GDP data from the BEA; covering the span of 1930 - 2011 |
One could argue that perhaps the above chart of GDP growth under the same year as the tax rate might not fully capture the impact because it may take time for changes in investment activity to filter into production of goods. So below let's look at a chart compiled by lining up the tax rates with the GDP growth for the year following the tax rate.
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| GDP data from the BEA; covering the span of 1931 - 2011 |
It's hard to get more clear than that. In both the same year and next year match-up scenarios, top marginal tax rates of 70% and above clearly correspond with higher GDP growth than top marginal tax rates below 70%. Indeed, during the Reagan years -- contrary to regressive notions -- lowered top marginal rates came with a corresponding drop in real GDP that manifested as a clear, year to year linear trending correlation. These correlations don't necessarily prove that the higher tax rates caused the higher GDP growth, but they certainly prove that lower tax rates have failed to fulfill the regressive claim. Judging from history, one can not reasonably expect that lowering upper bracket taxes will spur growth. And as Diamond and Saez have shown, there's no reason to expect lowering upper bracket taxes would increase our tax revenue either, since the optimal upper bracket rate for revenue collection sits far higher on the scale than where we are now, somewhere in the 70+% range.
If anything, the data suggests that raising upper bracket taxes may be more likely to spur growth. How could that be? The obvious answer is reinvestment. Lower upper bracket taxes encourage avoiding reinvestment to reap profit. Higher upper bracket taxes encourage reinvestment to avoid reaping taxable profit. That said, increasing upper bracket taxes alone will not fix everything. No matter how much tax policy encourages investment, there must be domestic market demand in order for domestic investment to make sense. Yet given enough demand to make domestic growth investments rational, higher upper bracket taxes can -- and logically will -- encourage that positive choice.
Labels:
fiscal,
GDP,
growth,
progressive,
regressive,
tax,
tax rates,
taxes,
top marginal,
upper bracket
Friday, September 14, 2012
Moody Broody Debt
From "Moody's threat to downgrade US debt is political, not fiscal":
"In the real world, the US doesn't even have a debt problem – net interest payments on the public debt are less than 1% of America's national income, or as low as they have been for more than 60 years. And the long-term deficit projections are a result of our healthcare system: if you substitute the healthcare costs of any other high-income country (or any country with a life expectancy as high as ours) in the US's budget, the long-term deficit turns into a surplus.
But Moody's wants us to be scared of the federal debt, so as to advance a rightwing agenda. But what they are doing is making a good case for serious reform of the ratings agencies."
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